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ABSTRACT: 
In recent years growing concern has been voiced in the environmental justice 
literature regarding the ability of criminal justice mechanisms to adequately 
address environmental harms, especially when such harms are perpetrated by 
large corporations. Commentators argue that criminal justice processes are 
often ill-suited to the particular features of environmental cases, where the chain 
of causation between wrongful actions/omissions and environmentally harmful 
consequence can be very complex and extend over the course of many years. 
As an alternative, many such commentators now favour the adoption of more 
administrative resolutions when corporate bodies breach their environmental 
obligations (which may or may not amount to ‘crimes’). Others favour the use of 
civil sanction regimes, which is now the preferred approach of the UK 
Environment Agency. In this paper I will argue that the debate on how best to 
respond to environmental harm has so far neglected to factor in the perspective 
of the victims of those harms and, in particular, their need for redress. I will 
argue that by incorporating such a perspective, as opposed to focusing largely 
on questions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the criminal justice route still 
has much to recommended it, especially in relation to the provision of 
meaningful redress and/or compensation to the victims of environmental harm. 
Consequently, this paper will provide a victimological defence of the criminal 
justice process, and of criminal penalties, in their application to cases of 
environmental harms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper concerns an increasingly pressing issue: the response of formal 
justice mechanisms to the impacts of environmental crime on its (human) 
victims. The harms being vested on individuals and communities across the 
world through environmentally polluting practices – often at the hands of 
corporate entities – are increasingly understood and increasingly condemned by 
commentators within and beyond the academy. Nevertheless, the mainstream 
legal and criminological literatures, when they consider environmental harm at 
all, have tended to focus their attention on the procedural efficiency of different 
justice solutions or the deterrence effects on polluters (Lynch et al., 2010). Very 
little of this literature considers the victims of environmental harm directly and 
2 
none of it has systematically set out to compare different mechanisms of 
redress from the victims’ perspective: along with how such redress might be 
better facilitated in all systems and what form such redress might take.  
The present article seeks to remedy this extremely unsatisfactory and 
potentially re-victimising state of affairs. It also seeks to challenge a present 
trend amongst commenters of criticising and deprioritising criminal routes of 
responding to environmental harm (see White, 2011). In so doing, the paper will 
argue that whilst both administrative compensation schemes and (more 
recently) civil sanction regimes are now often touted as the ‘best’ means of 
responding to environmental crimes or harms, few if any of these discussions 
focus on the issue of facilitating redress to the victims of those harms. Nor have 
the prevailing debates encompassed the wider body of literature from the field 
of victimology, where arguments concerning the delivery of compensation 
and/or restitution to victims of crime have been developing for many years (see 
Miers, 1997; Zhang, 2008). In short, my argument is that much of the present 
literature has ignored victim redress and victim satisfaction with any justice 
processes as criteria against which these systems should be judged. My 
argument is that victimological understandings of what victims of crime require 
by way of redress and due process from a justice system point to the continued 
relevance of the criminal justice route to redress (or ‘restitution’) in cases of 
environmental victimisation, as well as prompting us to consider other reforms 
in both administrative schemes and criminal redress mechanisms.  
A focus by victimologists on environmental crime (and the wider concept of 
environmental harm, to be discussed below) is one of the more recent 
outcomes of the broader development of ‘green criminology’ over the last 
twenty years (Hall, 2013). So far, however, there has been no systematic 
assessment or application of these broader victimological ideas to the question 
of redress for victims of environmental harm through civil, administrative or 
criminal justice processes. This paper sets out to correct this omission by 
scrutinising the options for redress open to victims of crime across a number of 
jurisdictions and offering the first systematic critical assessment of their 
suitability for use in environmental cases. In so doing the paper will critically 
examine the merits and demerits of civil litigation, administrative compensation 
schemes (both the public-funded and corporate-funded variety), civil sanctions 
regimes and criminal restitution mechanisms in offering redress to 
environmental victims. Having completed the analysis described above, the 
paper will then offer a framework for approaching redress in cases of 
environmental crime and wider environmental harm. In particular, this model will 
advocate the expansion of administrative compensation schemes beyond what 
is argued to be their current restrictive (often politically and economically-
motivated) limits to embrace wider forms of environmental victimisation. 
Concurrently, I argue that restitution through criminal process still has a vital 
role to play both for its (potential) accessibility to a wider group of environmental 
victims, its ability to offer meaningful financial redress in cases of corporate 
polluters and for the symbolic impact the recognition of such harms as 
‘criminally wrong’ can have both for victims and for society at large.    
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For the purpose of this discussion the term ‘compensation’ will generally be 
used to refer to monies paid to victims of environmental crime and harms by 
states from public funds. This will be contrasted to ‘restitution’, which will 
normally come from (corporate/individual) perpetrators (either as part of a 
criminal sanction or through an administrative scheme). I will refer to both terms 
collectively as ‘redress’. It should be noted that in the wider literature all these 
terms are used loosely and interchangeably. Furthermore, given that states may 
themselves be the perpetrators of (or at least contribute to) environmental harm 
(see Lynch et al., 2010) it cannot be assumed that all monies coming from 
public funds would constitute ‘compensation’ as it is understood here. Arguably 
it is precisely these kinds of conceptual uncertainties that have contributed to a 
situation where the question of redress for victims of environmental harm have 
not yet been the subject of detailed investigation by victimologists, 
criminologists or lawyers.  
‘Environmental victims?’ 
This paper focuses attention on the avenues of redress available to individuals 
and communities affected by environmental degradation (perpetrated by human 
actions) which impacts negatively upon their health, economic, or social life. 
‘Environmental victims’ will be used to encapsulate this group, although it must 
be acknowledged that the meaning and scope of that term is contested in the 
wider literature. Skinnider (2011) has highlighted the extremely broad range of 
impacts that environmental degradation can vest upon individuals and 
communities. Furthermore, the understanding adopted here might be criticised 
by green criminologists for its anthropocentric bias and a failure to incorporate 
more specifically the harm to non-human animals and the environment itself. 
Although questions concerning the use of redress mechanisms to ‘restore the 
environment’ will feature in the below analysis, the decision to focus here on 
human victims of environmental harm is largely driven by the recognition that, 
given this paper’s aim of adapting established victimological ideas to the ‘new’ 
issue of environmental harm, developing those ideas still further to encompass 
redress to non-human victims or to the environment itself (in its own right) would 
be a considerably larger undertaking beyond the limits of a single article. Such 
debates are however happening elsewhere in the green 
criminological/victimological literature (see Nurse, 2013). It is fully 
acknowledged however that the human victims who are the subjects of this 
discussion are in some ways merely symbolic of a far wider range of less 
anthropocentric victimisations occurring as a result of environmental crimes and 
harms.     
In other respects, the understanding of environmental victims utilised here will 
be quite broad, extending beyond those affected by officially recognised 
environmental crimes to encompass wider environmental harms. In recent 
years, the new study of environmental victimisation has prompted victimologists 
(like criminologists) to reconsider radical arguments that social harms often 
derive from powerful social elites. Stretesky et al. (2014) have recently 
stimulated this discussion by adapting Schnaiberg’s (1980) ‘treadmill of 
production’ to the question of environmental offending. Their resulting ‘treadmill 
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of crime’ theoretical model grounds environmental crimes, environmental harms 
and ecological destruction in general within the contemporary capitalistic 
imperative to increase production. It is the unimpeded pursuit of such 
production, the authors argue, that leads to what they refer to as ‘green crimes’: 
which they define widely as incorporating harms that are not officially 
criminalised. Consideration of victims not just of ‘crime’ but of what Article 18 of 
the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power called ‘abuse of power’ has fallen notably behind discussions of 
crime victims even within the mainstream victimological literature.   
As such the present discussion will recognise that many environmental 
harms/victimisations in fact serve the interest of corporate entities and the 
economic goals of the state (Lynch et al., 2010). This reflects the so-called 
‘social harms’ approach advocated by critical criminologists who seek to 
problematize power relations in society influencing which socially harmful 
activities are labelled as ‘criminal’ (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). Key to Stretesky 
et al.’s (2014) thought however is that environmental harms are distinguishable 
from the wider ambit of ‘social harms’, and therefore merit particular treatment, 
because the former come about as a result of corporate and state actors 
prioritising capitalist interests above environmental concerns. When we speak 
about ‘redress’ for victims of environmental crime we are therefore frequently 
talking about redress for environmentally harmful activities perpetrated by 
corporations and by states themselves which are not officially ‘crimes’ at all. 
The implication of this, it is submitted, is that any theoretical approach seeking 
to map out routes of redress for environmental victims must incorporate redress 
for the kinds of activities succinctly described by Passas (2005) as ‘lawful but 
awful’ (p.1).    
WHAT ‘REDRESS’ DO ENVIRONMENTAL VICTIMS WANT? WHAT DO 
THEY NEED? 
There is presently a dearth of empirical research on what victims of 
environmental crime, or wider environmental harms, might actually want from a 
justice process: be it civil, criminal or administrative. In this we see the 
hallmarks of a much longer trend characterized by a lack of consultation with 
victims of crime themselves in the formation of ostensibly ‘pro-victim’ policies. It 
is a state of affairs that has long been the subject of criticism in the mainstream 
victimological literature across many jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, the 1964 introduction of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 
was largely based on a presumption that victims wanted it and indeed might 
turn to vigilantism without it (Rock, 1990). With the recent focus now on 
evidence-based policy-making (Lawrence, 2006) this continued lack of direct 
consultation with environmental victims is concerning. Hall and Shapland (2014) 
offer the explanation that more direct consultation by policy makers would mean 
confronting what victims themselves say and think, rather than ‘using’ them as 
exemplars of damaged people in line with Garland’s (2001) view of ‘the culture 
of control’. Of course, in this sense environmental victims are threats not only to 
lawyers and the state, but also to environmental activist groups wishing to 
attack states if (for example) it turns out that they desire only respectful 
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treatment, information, understanding and an apology as opposed to more 
retributive outcomes.  
Given the above situation, green victimologists are at present forced to retreat 
to more theoretical discussion to anticipate what victims of environmental crime 
might need by way of redress for harms suffered. Whilst this is certainly 
unsatisfactory, the very lack of such a discussion in the literature so far 
precludes the development of empirical work and thus this paper is logical and 
necessary first step in a process leading to a more detailed and rounded 
understanding of what ‘real’ environmental victims actually think about justice 
and redress mechanisms.  
On this point Lee (2009) has emphasised the importance of a holistic, welfare-
based approach to environmental harms, rather than concentrating purely on 
financial compensation or restitution. As an alternative to simple, blanket, 
monetary compensation, Lee puts significant weight on the provision of long-
term, tailored support and restoration packages in individual communities. 
Given that ‘different localities inherit different cultural norms and characteristics’ 
(p.29), Lee also emphasises the vital role of local government in developing and 
facilitating the delivery of such packages. Further indications that at least some 
victims of environmental harm need much more than simple monetary 
recompense can be found in a telling case study by Wheatley (1997), 
concerning the significant cultural impacts on Canadian aboriginal peoples 
following mercury poisoning of their traditional lands and food/water supplies. 
As the author observes:  
Even after compensation was paid social problems persisted, especially in 
Whitedog, where solvents are smuggled into the community and 4 suicides 
were reported in the spring of 1995 (p.78).    
The importance of non-monetary restitution is further underlined by the more 
established victimological literature which consistently holds that, in criminal 
justice systems, payments from offenders tend to carry greater symbolic value 
to victims of crime than monies allocated from taxation (Shapland, 2003). 
Malsch (1999) too has emphasised the importance of ‘immaterial damages’ for 
victims of crime and the complexities inherent in addressing these in the 
criminal justice context. Shapland (2003), having interviewed victims directly on 
the question of compensation/restitution, concluded that victims feel their pain 
and suffering has been duly recognised by the system when judges order 
offenders to pay restitution, constituting in their eyes a vindication of their ‘victim 
status’ (Miers, 1980). Indeed, emphasising so-called ‘procedural justice’ 
perspectives (Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002) such commentators have 
argued that victims’ feelings of being fully recognised (as genuinely ‘harmed’) by 
a justice system along with the respect and courtesy afforded to them within it 
are the key drivers of their satisfaction with the process. Evidence of this 
attitude has been forthcoming both in qualitative studies like those of Shapland 
(2003) and in quantitative surveys of victims and witnesses in criminal 
proceedings (Angle et al., 2003).  
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Both theory and empirical evidence from the mainstream victimological 
literature therefore indicate that victims of (non-environmental) crime often care 
as much about how a justice system treats them than its instrumental 
outcomes, including any redress that might be forthcoming from that system. In 
relation to environmental victims the situation is markedly less clear due to the 
almost total absence of empirical research in which these victims have been 
directly questioned on what they would hope to take away from a justice 
system. Nevertheless, if we apply what we do know from the victimological 
literature it can be confidently asserted that the simple payment of money to 
individuals, groups or communities harmed by environmentally destructive 
activities (whether they be crimes or not) is likely to constitute at best a broad 
brush means of addressing the impacts of such activities, and at worst may fall 
far short of full redress. 
At this point we should also acknowledge the growing body of hard law 
concerning victims of crime of all descriptions at the national and international 
level.  In the context of England and Wales, particularly relevant to this decision 
is 2012 EU Directive (2012/29/EU) establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. Article 16 of tis Directive gives victims the 
‘Right to decision on compensation from the offender in the course of criminal 
proceeding’ and in paragraph two notes: ‘Member States shall promote 
measures to encourage offenders to provide adequate compensation to 
victims’. The Directive also provides victims a ‘right to be heard’ in criminal 
proceedings  (Article 10). The remainder of this paper will critically assess 
mechanisms for providing environmental victims with redress in an effort to 
evaluate how they measure up to these rather difficult criteria.  
MECHANISMS OF REDRESS  
This part of the discussion will be ordered by first setting out the key criticisms 
that have been made of the criminal justice route as it relates to environmental 
crimes. It will then move on to consider civil litigation, and administrative 
compensation/restitution schemes followed by civil sanctions mechanisms. 
Throughout these discussions I will refer back to the basic criticisms of the 
criminal route to explore how the alternatives (especially administrative 
systems) are said to address these, as well as highlighting their limitations from 
a victimological perceptive. I will then return to defend the criminal route at the 
end of this section through exploring how, in the light of the limitations of other 
mechanisms, its advantages for victims are still evident notwithstanding the 
previous criticisms.  
I will begin this discussion on potential routes of redress for victims of 
environmental crime and wider harms by returning to the indication made at the 
start of this paper to the effect that criminal justice routes are not presently in 
vogue. As noted by Bell et. al (2013): 
The criminal law, as a means of supporting traditional forms of regulation, is 
to an extent being supplemented by what are more administrative methods of 
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law enforcement the use of environmental civil sanctions being central here 
(p.265) 
In fact, this trend represents something of a reversal whereby in many 
countries, particularly in the UK, criminal law has been the traditional approach 
to tackling environmental degradation (Bell et al., 2013). Indeed, across the 
European Union as a whole, EU Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the 
environment through the criminal law specifically requires EU member states to 
apply criminal sanctions to enforce EU environmental law.  
The above notwithstanding, recent criticisms that have arisen around the 
criminal process as it applies to environmental cases focus on the apparent 
difficulties with achieving convictions. From the perspective of the victims of 
environmental harm this is clearly significant because in most jurisdictions 
criminal redress takes the form of court-based restitution orders imposed as 
part of a sentence against environmental offenders following conviction. 
Significantly, proving causation to the high criminal standard between a 
polluting act (or omission) and a given consequence (harm) is often challenging. 
Even when a conviction is achieved for an environmental offence O’Hear (2004) 
highlights the difficulty of establishing culpability for the full range of wider 
consequences. On this point a criminal court is arguably ill-equipped to 
calculate the degree of harm incurred by environmental victims and order 
restitution accordingly: especially given the nature of such harms could be 
health related, economic, social, or cultural (Skinnider, 2011). Such difficulties 
seem to reflect broader problems faced by criminal justice systems when 
confronted with environmental offenders and environmental victims. In 
particular, these cases are often characterised by mass victimisation, which 
most criminal justice systems still find difficult to assimilate, recalling of course 
that most such systems around the world are still struggling to integrate 
individual victims of more traditional crimes. Indeed, one especially pertinent 
issue here – again raised by Skinnider (2011) – is that not only might 
environmental cases involve large numbers of victims, those victims may all 
have different – sometimes competing – needs and expectations. For example, 
if a corporation must offer redress to victims affected by its polluting practices, 
those victims who happen to work for said corporation may risk losing their jobs. 
Bearing in mind the above basic criticisms of the criminal process, this paper 
will now examine the alternatives on offer for environmental victims seeking 
redress before returning to make the case that, from a victim’s perspective, 
criminal justice mechanisms still have a vital role to play in responding to 
environmental harm.  
Redress though civil litigation 
The option of environmental victims pursuing civil litigation against individuals, 
corporations or states perpetrating environmental harms against them is one 
that can be dealt with relatively briefly. This is because the considerable finance 
required to pursue such civil claims often excludes this as a realistic option. This 
is particularly the case given that, as with victims of other kinds of crime, there 
is growing evidence to support the conclusion that environmental victimisation 
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disproportionately falls on the poor and marginalised within society: at a national 
and international level (see Ruggiero and South, 2010). Given that in most 
jurisdictions there is little to no public funding available for such litigation, these 
costs must be borne by the victims themselves or by victims’ groups (Castle, 
1996). It is chiefly for this reason that commentators in the area have become 
increasingly disparaging of so-called ‘toxic torts’ (Goldberg and Zipersky, 2011). 
Pursuing civil claims presents other difficulties too, which Skinnider (2011) 
summarises in the following terms: 
Limitations for such remedies include where the perpetrator is not in the 
same jurisdiction as the victim; where the perpetrator is not readily 
identifiable; evidentiary burden of proof; and costs of litigation (p.74). 
As such, although requiring a lower standard of proof than the criminal route 
discussed below, civil litigants must still establish culpability on the part of 
specified respondents which, given the nature of polluting activity, is likely to be 
problematic in many cases.  
One potentially very important advantage of civil litigation as a means of 
securing restitution for environmental victims is the class action process 
available in many jurisdictions, allowing large groups of victims to sue polluters 
collectively (Johnson and Onwegbuzie, 2004). In principle such mechanisms 
offer an important advantage over generally individualistic criminal justice 
systems and the administrative compensation schemes discussed below, 
because they account for the element of mass victimisation that is often present 
in environmental cases. Nevertheless, class actions too have been criticised 
from the perspective of environmental harm, principally because ‘these legal 
rules were not designed with environmental actions specifically in mind and 
have been noted to be notoriously difficult to get certified in environmental 
cases’ (Skinnider, 2011: p.75). In addition, Lin (2005) has noted the alleged 
misuse of the class action system in a number of (US) cases of environmental 
damage to ‘enrich attorneys rather than benefit plaintiffs’ (p.1516).  
Redress through administrative compensation and restitution schemes 
O’Hear (2004) has argued that administrative redress systems for 
environmental harms (in this case brought about through climate change) carry 
numerous advantages over both civil and criminal court restitution procedures. 
His main argument is that such schemes can operate under a more 
comprehensive set of pre-defined rules. Lin (2005) adds to this argument the 
benefits of the standardized schedules of damages employed by such 
schemes. Of course, whilst these offer greater certainty, they often allow for 
very little adaptation of the rules to specific situations. Given the gaps in our 
knowledge concerning the full range of effects engendered by environmental 
degradation, an over-rigid system may thus not serve many victims of 
environmental harm particularly well.  
Following from the last point, O’Hear argues that more diverse forms of 
environmental harms (impairment of ‘characteristics of the landscape’ and 
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disruption or impairment of lifestyles of indigenous communities) have 
‘traditionally not received nearly as sophisticated consideration in the legal 
system as have others’ (p.162). This argument is supported by Bowman (2002) 
who argues that such compensation schemes that have been implemented 
around the world in response to environmental degradation: 
have not really involved recognition of harm to the environment at all, but 
have been concerned with the infringement of established human interests 
relating to the person or property caused through the medium of the 
environment (pp.12-13). 
This raises the important point that administrative compensation schemes are 
often concerned with human claimants rather than restoration of the 
environment as a whole, albeit monies from such funds can be channelled into 
more generalised efforts to repair the environment. On a more affirmative note, 
such schemes are usually designed to cater for large groups of 
victims/claimants, one of the rationales being that approaching such mass 
victimisation in this manner is more efficient than multiple tortious cases going 
through the civil courts for a protracted period, as occurred (and is still 
occurring) after the Bhopal gas disaster in India in 1984. Indeed, Lin (2005) has 
argued that a key advantage of administrative compensation schemes for cases 
of environmental harm is they have the potential to compensate those who are 
not yet affected by environmental damage but are at a significant risk of 
becoming so, extending to future generations of harmed persons. Of course, 
this can only occur if schemes award redress on an ex post rather than ex ante 
basis. An example of the former system is the compensation system being 
designed for the UK, where communities located near sites of hydraulic 
fracturing will receive compensation in advance of harm occurring (Department 
of Energy & Climate Change, 2014). It is of no small concern that, given the 
uncertainties surrounding both hydraulic fracturing itself and its medium- to 
longer-term impacts on local people and local environments, such payments are 
unlikely to cover the full range of future harms.    
Farber (2007) has argued that the problem of establishing causation in cases of 
environmental crime can be avoided by offering victims what he calls 
‘proportional recovery’ which would reflect the probability of their injuries having 
been caused by exposure to pollutants. In cases where different groups of 
victims have different chances of becoming subject to environmental harm, 
O’Hear (2007) too advocates the risk-based approach, avoiding the difficulty of 
proving causation in criminal (or civil) courts. For Lin (2005) the advantages of a 
risk-based administrative restitution systems over civil and criminal courts are 
very clear. He suggest that administrative systems can provide more continuous 
oversight and distribute compensation more fairly among a class of victims, 
whilst also being more politically accountable than the judicial system. Lin also 
argues that administrative systems typically employ specialized or expert 
decision makers who can conduct their own studies and consider a broad range 
of information. This avoids the limitations of criminal restitution discussed 
above, whereby courts are not equipped to quantify the full range of 
environmental impacts, especially in common law jurisdictions. That said, Lin 
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does place considerable faith in the ability of modern science to assess risk 
accurately. This may be over generous given the continuous development in 
knowledge of environmentally induced harms along with the still considerable 
gaps in that knowledge.  
In principle then, administrative schemes as a means of redress for 
environmental victims have much to recommend them. The evidence points to 
such systems being more efficient and less time consuming that their court-
based equivalents (Farber, 2007). Furthermore, the removal of the need to 
prove causation (to either the criminal or civil standard) should in theory 
facilitate more pay-outs. Significant questions do however remain as to whether 
such schemes are always best from the perspective of environmental victims 
themselves. The funding of the schemes, for example, brings a number of 
complex issues. Direct payments from the polluter to the victims seem the most 
beneficial option, both financially and symbolically. In addition, such payments 
might have specific and general deterrent effects on polluters. However in a 
scheme like this either the standard of proof (and the certainty of causation to 
be established) would need to be greater or such schemes must be restricted to 
very specific events and/or groups of people.  
The main difficulty with the latter of the two options just presented is that this 
obviously excludes a great number of victims, which can be illustrated by 
examining one of the most recent high-profile administrative restitution schemes 
related to environmental victimisation: the $20 billion fund constituted through 
talks between BP and the US government following the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico. This fund is financed by BP and 
administered by an ‘independent claims facility’ that, controversially, is 
managed by an employee of BP (2010). The scheme can pay monies to 
businesses, state departments and individuals demonstrating ‘legitimate claims 
including natural resource damages and state and local response costs’ (BP, 
2010).  
Given the worldwide interest in the case it might be speculated that the speed 
with which the US and BP brokered the deal reflects the political underpinnings 
to the scheme. Indeed, the argument that most victims compensation schemes 
are based on perceived political necessity is one frequently cited in the 
victimological literature (Elias, 1986; Harland, 1978; Miers, 1997). The 
continued high degree of interest in the workings of the Gulf of Mexico scheme 
by the US media in particular has maintained the disaster as a political issue. 
Whilst overall the scheme is a positive step in the direction of addressing the 
needs of these environmental victims, it also exemplifies the disparity between 
the treatment of environmental victims in newsworthy cases compared to 
provisions for such victims more broadly at the national and international level. 
Van Tassell argues (2011):  
The Gulf of Mexico oil spill and British Petroleum’s quick efforts to pay for 
clean-up and compensation for victims may lead many people to falsely 
conclude that national and international laws operate effectively to make the 
polluter pay for harm. In truth, clean-up and compensation is rarely 
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accomplished so efficiently, and laws operate to insulate polluters when they 
disaster occurs in poorer countries (unpaginated). 
In this instance the author draws particular comparisons with the large number 
of environmental victims going uncompensated in Nigeria, following the 
widespread pollution caused by the oil industry. The criticism therefore is that 
whilst highly visible, relatively lucrative administrative schemes are available for 
major one-off polluting events in developed jurisdictions (with the ability to 
broker deals with large, multi-national corporations) this does little to address 
the more general absence of such compensation or restitution mechanisms 
internationally for more endemic, but perhaps less media-friendly, examples of 
environmental victimisation. This disparity also reflects the inequality of impact 
of environmental harm between rich and poor nations discussed by Ruggiero 
and South (2010).  
The restrictiveness of many administrative schemes, along with their 
susceptibility to outside economic and political pressures can be further 
illustrated by an example from Japan, where an administrative pollution 
compensation scheme has been running in some form since 1973 (see 
Bronston, 1983). Implemented in the wake of growing industrialisation after the 
Second World War, originally the scheme paid monetary compensation to 
victims resident in pre-defined areas of the country who contracted specifically 
defined diseases. The geographical areas were initially split into ‘Class I’ and 
‘Class II’ locales. Class I locations were areas where air pollution was especially 
prevalent. Victims falling ill to one of a number of defined respiratory illnesses 
could claim from a fund raised from levies and taxes placed on polluting 
corporations (specifically, emitters of sulphur oxides). In Class II areas a causal 
relationship had been established between a polluting agent and certain health 
effects. In these areas monies could be reclaimed directly from the polluter. 
Politically Class I payments proved to be the most contentious, and in the long 
term the government bowed to corporate pressures to cancel all the Class I 
area designations in 1988. Lin (2005) describes the situation in the following 
terms: 
emitters reasonably contended that it was unfair to hold them financially 
responsible for illnesses caused by other polluters.  From the perspective of 
industry, causation standards were so relaxed that the system became a no-
fault compensation scheme (p.1498). 
This perspective illustrates that whilst a lower threshold of causation is one of 
the befits of applying administrative restitution schemes to environmental harm, 
as opposed to criminal or civil standards of proof, if the system becomes too 
open it will not be perceived as fair by those who must fund it. Indeed, in this 
case for both Class I and II claims victims did not have to show any but-for 
causation between the pollutant and their disease specifically. This is significant 
because such (largely corporate) actors are also likely to have the economic 
and political sway to lobby against such a system, as was the case in Japan. It 
is also of course highly likely that if, as in the Japanese system, polluting 
restitution schemes are funded by a blanket levy on polluting companies the 
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costs of such levies will simply be passed on to consumers, dampening any 
deterrence effect (on which, see below).  
The other chief criticism of the Japanese model is its narrow focus on specific 
types of harm (pre-defined diseases) and even to specific areas of the country. 
Furthermore, the compensation remains available only to cover medical costs. 
This is many steps removed from a system covering the full range of 
environmental harms and does nothing towards repairing the environment itself. 
Indeed, the classification of areas in this manner seems to betray official 
acceptance that some areas are to be surrendered to pollution for the benefit of 
the greater economic good, and with them the environmental victimisation of 
their residents. This is the very essence of Stretesky et al.’s (2014) ‘treadmill’ 
explanation of environmental crime discussed above.  
Both the Japanese and the US schemes discussed above are ultimately 
financed by polluting corporations. Another option is for states to fund 
compensation payments, on a welfare basis. In theory such schemes could be 
directed at a wider range of environmental harms. The majority of western 
jurisdictions already have developed systems of compensating victims of 
criminal acts from public funds. Indeed, the development of state-based 
compensation schemes over the last 50 years has spawned a great deal of 
academic debate, concerning their rationale and justifications, which can 
provide important insights for the application of such a scheme to cases of 
(criminal or non-criminal) environmental harm. 
In most cases the particulars of state-based criminal compensation schemes 
restrict the availability of compensation to those who have suffered physical 
injury as a result of violent crime (see Hall, 2010 for a full review). Indeed, most 
state-based criminal compensation mechanisms are aimed at so-called ‘ideal’ 
(individual) victims1 and at stereotypical notions of suffering, both of which tend 
to exclude environmental victims (see New Zealand Law Commission, 2008; 
Irish Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal, 2009). This is especially 
unfortunate in the environmental context given that a key advantage of seeking 
compensation though these systems is that, in most cases, a conviction does 
not have to be achieved and an offender need not even be identified. This 
avoids the problem of establishing culpability and achieving convictions 
highlighted previously. Furthermore, to include environmental victims within 
such schemes would imply recognition of environmental harms as criminally 
perpetrated, which might prove significant from the perspective of both the 
individual victims and that of wider society, as discussed above.  
As with restitution orders in criminal justice processes, it is acknowledged in a 
number of jurisdictions that the payments made by criminal injuries 
compensation schemes are symbolic, even though the sums involved are often 
                                                 
1 Famously characterized by Christie (1986) as: being weak; carrying out a ‘respectable project’; 
being free of blame; and being a stranger to a ‘big and bad’ offender. To be labelled as a bone 
fide victim Christie argued that one must first conform to this ideal and then ‘make your case 
known’ to the justice system.  
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greater than that which can be paid by most offenders (Hall, 2013). On the other 
hand, it could be drawn from the more mainstream victimological literature that 
victims of environmental harm would find payments from the state less 
symbolically beneficial than payments from those responsible for this 
victimisation. Of course a key reason such schemes present themselves as 
offering symbolic rather than full economic compensation is to control escalating 
costs, which have been witnessed in almost all jurisdictions that have 
introduced them (Zhang, 2008).  
A recurring question in these debates is whether states should in fact be paying 
anything at all to those who have suffered harm (environmental or otherwise). In 
relation to victims of environmental harm, we have seen that the notion of 
grounding an administrative compensation scheme on welfare principles has 
been championed by Lee (2009). Nevertheless, Miers (1997) has argued that in 
reality states rarely pay compensation to victims (of crime) based on welfare 
needs. Indeed, his argument is that these schemes are rather based on 
perceived political necessity, as discussed above. Of particular significance to 
the present discussion, the New Zealand Law Commission (2008), in arguing 
for a major rethink of the grounding of their own criminal injuries compensation 
system (the first in the world), raised questions concerning the special 
consideration being afforded to victims of crime here, as opposed to wider 
social harms. The Commission noted that ‘it is generally difficult to justify 
special treatment of crime victims on grounds of social utility’ (para.4.3). Given 
the reality that much environmentally destructive activity is in fact state-
sanctioned rather than criminalised (constituting an environmental harm rather 
than an environmental crime) such debates are extremely pertinent in any 
discussion of public compensation for victims of environmental harm. 
One solution to this impasse might be to distinguish environmental harms from 
other forms of ‘social harm’ by reference to the former’s grounding in a capitalist 
imperative and the prioritisation of production, as proposed by Stretesky et al. 
(2014). On this basis, public compensation is based on both a welfare 
perspective and the understanding that the harm has derived at least in part 
from the economic prioritisation by the state of production at the expense of 
environment. Of course, for some this might be tantamount to the state 
admitting fault or at least a failure to protect the environment (and therefore its 
citizens) from victimisation. Such arguments are universally rejected by all 
jurisdictions as the basis for state compensation schemes. Nevertheless, in 
many cases it will be possible to demonstrate that the state, through economic 
growth or taxation, has benefitted from the environmentally destructive activities 
of corporate polluters. In this situation it becomes more difficult for the state to 
argue that public funds are not suitable for compensation purposes in cases of 
environmental harm, albeit on a no-fault basis.  
The above notwithstanding, a publicly funded state-based compensation 
scheme would also remove any element of deterrence from the process for 
polluters themselves. It also ignores the so-called ‘polluter pays’ principle which 
has been a yardstick used in both national and international environmental law 
for many years (Tobey and Smets, 1996). On this point Bronston (1983) has 
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argued that a scheme seeking to marry both deterrence and victim 
compensation elements is unlikely to succeed:   
A system stressing compensation, however, is almost a necessity in this field 
because an alternative system stressing both compensation and deterrence 
would be limited to injuries where a hazardous substance and a firm 
responsible for that substance could be identified. In such a mixed system, 
victims of injuries where substances and firms were not identified would be 
denied compensation. Consequently, the moral arguments for compensating 
innocent victims of hazardous substances quickly and inexpensively are 
stronger than for deterring identifiable firms from polluting by making them 
absorb the costs (p.516). 
Thus, Bronston argues strongly against prioritising deterrence as the basis of 
such schemes. The difficulty however is that this clearly restricts the degree of 
compensation victims can expect. In this respect, the criminal redress route 
seems more attractive, offering the possibility of large sums in restitution 
payment and the deterrence associated with criminal prosecution.  
Overall, whilst administrative compensation and restitution schemes in principle 
have much to recommend them, there is often a considerable gulf between the 
promise of such systems and the operational reality, at least from a victims’ 
perspective. In reality such schemes appear to be largely ad hoc, or focused on 
very specific forms or instances of environmental harm, sometimes calculated 
based on ex ante projections of harm that might occur. There also seems to be 
a connection between the formation of these schemes and the mediatisation 
and politicisation of high profile ‘pollution catastrophes’ and, in addition, they are 
far more prevalent in developed, rich jurisdictions compared with the global 
south. We have also seen that such schemes can be heavily influenced by 
corporate and political interests. Consequently, whilst administrative 
compensation schemes seem particularly suited to one-off or perhaps 
especially serious events, it is more difficult to advocate their use as the sole 
means of compensating victims of environmental harm when so many of these 
victims would seemingly fail to qualify. In this situation, it is submitted that 
criminal-based restitution might constitute a vital safety net. 
The rise of civil sanctions 
At the beginning of this paper it was noted that criminal-based redress for 
environmental harm has been rebuffed in a lot of the recent legal literature. Bell 
et al. (2013) argue that the utilisation of civil resolutions (as opposed to civil 
litigation discussed above) in environmental cases is on the increase in many 
jurisdictions and markedly so in the UK, where a system of civil sanctions as 
alternatives to environmental prosecutions was rolled out in January 2011. 
Such sanctions essentially comprise orders issued to polluting agents by a 
regulatory body (the Environment Agency in England and Wales) to compel 
them to cease or adapt their practices and, in some cases, to carry out remedial 
works. The extension of civil sanctions is presently a key strategy of the UK Law 
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Commission concerning wildlife crime, with similar approaches also in evidence 
in Australia (Ogus and Abbot, 2001) and New Zealand (New Zealand Law 
Commission, 2012). Across Europe, the development of civil sanctions for 
environmental harms was prompted by the introduction of the EU 
Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC), although this instrument has 
itself been criticised both for a lack of precision in its mechanisms of 
determining the extent of injuries to natural resources (Paradissis, 2005) and 
because it fails to establish any genuine EU-wide civil liability regime (Bell et al, 
2013).  
In general terms the primary arguments in favour of civil sanctions in 
environmental cases are that they allow for greater flexibility and are generally 
thought to be cheaper to apply than criminal prosecutions (Mann, 1992). From 
the perspective of the present paper, the difficulty with civil sanction regimes is 
that few of the sanctions presently in use across the EU and beyond have built 
in provisions concerning the victims of environmental harm. Although polluters 
can be ordered to ‘restore the environment’, there is no requirement that 
specific individuals or groups affected by environmental harms are offered 
redress. Real questions therefore remain as to whether civil sanctions, whilst 
representing managerial and administrative benefits to the justice system, can 
also represent eco-centric values for the environment itself or represent the 
needs of environmental victims.    
Faure and Svatikova (2012) offer an examination of the relative merits of 
criminal and administrative/civil sanctions in environmental cases based on a 
study of four European jurisdictions: the Flemish Region and the UK (which 
have traditionally favoured the criminal route) and Germany and the 
Netherlands (which have traditionally used civil sanctions). Their conclusion is 
that the most efficient system is one that combines criminal prosecutions for the 
most serious environmental transgressions and administrative or civil sanctions 
for the majority of other cases. Nevertheless, this conclusion is based on an 
assessment of the deterrence effect of the different mechanisms on would-be 
polluters rather than the impact on environmental victims or indeed the benefits 
accrued to the environment as a whole. As such, their conclusions come with 
an important health-label:    
one has to be careful with generalising the conclusion that systems that allow 
for a more balanced use of the criminal law (by combining it with 
administrative law for minor or moderately serious violations) are more 
efficient than systems, which merely rely on the criminal law. After all, our 
data did not allow us to test the overall effectiveness of the differing 
approaches as far as the effect on environmental quality is concerned, nor on 
compliance with environmental regulation by firms. Moreover, economic 
literature has equally indicated that administrative law systems may have the 
disadvantage that enforcing agencies could enter into a collusive relationship 
with the regulated firms as a result of which also administrative agencies 
could not always impose efficient sanctions (p.33) 
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This conclusion also alludes to the concern that regulatory capture may skew 
the application and enforcement of both civil sanctions and other administrative 
schemes. For present purposes, the key point is that whilst civil sanctions 
appear to bring advantages, offering redress to victims of environmental harm 
or indeed (from a less anthropocentric perspective) protecting/repairing the 
environment itself are not amongst the proven benefits. 
Criminal law and redress for environmental victims 
The above analysis has demonstrated real limitations in the utilization of civil 
litigation as means of achieving restitution for environmental victims. Likewise, 
civil sanction regimes have a number of advantages but for the most part have 
not been designed with the goal of victim redress at the forefront. Administrative 
compensations and/or restitution schemes have received a great deal of 
attention and in many ways offer a more realistic route to redress for some 
victims. Nevertheless, these schemes are often limited in terms of the type of 
victims they encompass and are susceptible to political influence and 
undermining. Publicly funded versions of such schemes remain controversial for 
a number of reasons: the costs involved to the public purse; the principle of 
awarding money without admitting fault on the part of the state and, from a 
victimological perspective, such payments may lack symbolic resonance.    
For all the above reasons I argue that the criminal route of redress merits 
greater attention from the perspective of victims of environmental harm seeking 
redress. Indeed, in contrast to the apparent difficulties of incorporating 
environmental victimisation within criminal justice processes, for other forms of 
victimisation it is clear that many countries have in recent years turned to 
offenders to provide monetary restitution: either directly though court-based 
orders or through the establishment of victims’ funds maintained by offender 
surcharges and fines (Whitehead and Block, 2003; Canadian Department of 
Justice, 2012). Indeed, such restitution has become an integral and mandatory 
component of many of the world’s criminal justice systems (see Hall, 2010). 
Such developments are not without their controversy, as they fundamentally call 
into question the purpose of a criminal justice system as being concerned with 
public wrongs against the state rather than private wrongs against individuals 
(see Cape, 2004). Commentators have questioned whether the increased focus 
on victim redress comes at the expense of fairness for defendants, the 
proportionality (‘just desserts’) of a sentence when supplemented by such 
restitution and even the proper adherence to defendants’ rights (Ashworth, 
2000). The space is lacking to go into detail on these complex (and often 
normative) arguments. For present purposes it might suffice to proceed on the 
basis that because criminal justice mechanisms in many jurisdictions now have 
quite well established mechanisms of offering direct redress for victims of some 
crimes, it is incumbent upon commentators to explore this option for victims of 
environmental harm as well. Below I will go further than this to argue that the 
criminal route offers a number of advantages for victims of environmental harm 
specifically.   
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From the victims’ perspective, we have already seen that such a move is well 
supported by the victimological literature, which consistently holds that 
payments from offenders carry greater cathartic value to victims of crime than 
monies allocated from taxation and may increase satisfaction with the justice 
system. As such, criminal redress in such cases may bring the distinct 
advantage of providing some financial relief as well as having important 
symbolic impacts for victims themselves. Indeed, the latter point has been 
acknowledged by the European Commission (2001), which argued that 
imposing criminal sanctions in environmental cases ‘demonstrates a social 
disapproval of qualitatively different nature compared to administrative 
sanctions or a compensation mechanism under civil law’ (p.238). The overall 
effect, it is suggested, is to increase condemnation of such acts and raise 
awareness as to their dangerousness and the harms they engender. This also 
hints at the potential for criminal restitution to combine redress for victims and 
deterrence amongst environmental offenders in a way we have seen 
administrative systems find challenging. 
When discussing other forms of criminal victimisation, the importance of the 
symbolic benefit to victims of receiving money directly from offenders is often 
used to counteract the point that individual offenders themselves are frequently 
unable to afford to pay much if any restitution, and therefore the sums involved 
cannot be said to compensate the victim in a financial sense (Nagin and 
Waldfogel, 1998). Herein lies one of the primary distinctions between the 
offenders who typically commit traditional crimes and environmental offenders, 
who might well be large corporations. Such corporations will often be in a 
position to afford much more in the way of financial restitution. Indeed, criminal-
based remedies have also on occasion proven a strategically beneficial option 
for the recovery of monies from environmental offenders. Richardson (2010) 
writes how, following the 1989 Exxon oil spill off the coast of Alaska, the US 
federal government sought recovery of natural resource damages to Prince 
William Sound ‘not by pursuing a civil claim against Exxon ... but by filing 
criminal charges’ (p.4). As such, the Exxon Shipping Company was charged 
with criminal violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act. 
Significantly, both these crimes carried penalties that would require restitution to 
injured parties. In this case the injured party was deemed to be the United 
States itself, through damage to its natural environmental. The criminal route 
was chosen because legislation imposed significant limitations on the amount 
that could be claimed from polluters under civil law (and indeed this remains 
limited in many jurisdictions). The outcome was that Exxon pleaded guilty and a 
financial settlement was reached through negotiation with the US government.  
As such, criminal redress brings the advantages of being – at least in principle – 
open to all victims of environmental crime (albeit not environmental harms). It 
also can facilitate larger monetary restitution payments from environmental 
offenders, is much less vulnerable to political influence, offers the cathartic and 
symbolic benefits to victims of being recognised as ‘criminally harmed’ (as 
reported by the victimological literature) and has the deterrent effect of criminal 
prosecution for polluters. 
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Accruing the above advantages is of course contingent on achieving 
prosecutions in these cases in the first place, which we have seen has been 
problematic in many criminal justice systems. Nevertheless, this may indicate 
less of a fundamental incompatibility between criminal justice and 
environmental cases and more a need for greater understanding of 
environmental crime and environmental harm in general amongst both 
prosecution and (perhaps more significantly) police and investigative agencies, 
thus allowing them to build stronger cases to meet the criminal standard. Carter 
(1998) has argued that successful prosecutions of environmental offences in 
criminal courts would rise dramatically if police officers were to adopt more 
proactive strategies: 
Law enforcement officers should carefully document their observations by 
making detailed written records of what they see, hear and smell. 
Photographing or videotaping suspicious operations or incidence is even 
better. The officers should patrol their communities with an increased 
awareness of the various methods used by environmental criminals. 
Frequent contact with community members and cooperation will increase the 
chance that environmental crime initiatives will succeed (p.181) 
Carter also stresses that police officers need to be trained on the dangers of 
environmentally harmful practices to avoid risks to themselves and thus a core 
of scientific expertise within the police service needs to be instilled within its 
working culture. In addition, the author empathises the need to approach the 
detention and investigation of environmental offences from a multi-agency 
standpoint. Whilst it is unlikely that better policing and better investigations can 
entirely solve the problems of the criminal justice process in its handling of 
environmental cases, lack of knowledge of environmental law has been 
demonstrated by Lynch et al. (2010) in a number of jurisdictions amongst 
investigators and the judiciary. 
Staying with the judiciary, in England and Wales at least, evidence suggests 
that the barrier to redress through restitution in the criminal court occurs not at 
the trial and conviction stage, but rather derives from an underutilisation of 
restitution orders by sentencers in these cases. On this point, the House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2004) received evidence from the 
Environmental Industries Commission suggesting:   
Whilst there is statutory provision for the criminal courts to order an offender 
to remedy the environmental harm caused, it is not apparent that this is often 
used (p.63). 
The guidance notes mentioned here are based on those issued at the time by 
the Sentencing Council, which said that if a specific victim in environmental 
cases is identifiable a court should consider imposing a compensation order2 
                                                 
2  Which, somewhat confusingly, is the name for criminal court-based restitution orders in 
England and Wales. 
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against offenders. Under s.130(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act courts are required to give reasons why they have not 
imposed compensation orders in all cases and s.130(12) mandates that 
compensation orders must take precedence over fines if offenders are only able 
to afford one of the two. The Sentencing Council has since issued further 
guidelines for the imposition of fines and other penalties in environmental crime 
cases in an attempt to address the apparently haphazard nature of sentencing 
in this area, addressing the lack of knowledge amongst the judiciary 
(Sentencing Council, 2014). 
Bell et al. (2013) argue that the explanation for the underutilisation of 
compensation orders in cases of environmental crime in England and Wales 
(compared to their increased use in most other areas of criminal sentencing, 
mandated by the legislation) lies mainly with the existence of many statutory 
powers of clean-up and cost recovery available to regulatory agencies in 
defined situations (for example, s.59 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
and s.161A of the Water Resources Act 1991). In addition, the authors argue, 
under s.131 of the 2000 Act compensation orders are restricted to a maximum 
of £5,000, a sum that in fact may often be insufficient to fully restore victims or 
their environment to their previous state, if indeed any sum of money can 
achieve this. Skinnider (2011) has commented on the difficulty of applying 
restitution orders in cases of ‘mass’ or ‘community’ environmental victimisation 
especially where, as noted previously, not all victims have compatible needs. 
This point might however be countered by reference to the now quite developed 
systems available in most countries whereby victims of crime can offer ‘impact’ 
statements’ to the court to be used at the sentencing stage. In some 
jurisdictions these have included so-called ‘community impacts statement’ 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2016). Nevertheless, a further problem in some 
jurisdictions, notably Canada, is that restitution orders are sometimes restricted 
to certain proscribed offences, which do not include environmental crime (see 
Canadian Department of Justice, 2012).   
Of course, the fact that the sums involved may be insufficient to restore victims 
to the state they were in prior to the effect of an environmental crime is in 
keeping with the notion that the purpose of restitution, at least in England and 
Wales, is largely symbolic. Elsewhere the situation is less restricted. For 
example, in the South African criminal justice system criminal ‘restitution’ is 
defined as the return or repair of property by the offender ‘in order to restore 
you [the victim] to the position you were in prior to the commission of the 
offence’ (South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
2008: pp.13-15). This was also the rationale given for the introduction of 
mandatory restitution orders in the Netherlands in the Terwee Act 1995 
(Wemmers, 1996).  
It is therefore submitted that limitations evident in the use of criminal redress in 
cases of environmental victimisation do not stem from some assumed 
incompatibility between the criminal law and environmental harms. Rather, the 
application of redress in such cases has been uncertain, ill-informed and 
subject to arbitrary restrictions which do not account for the extensive finances 
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available to corporate offenders to provide redress. Such an unfettered version 
of restitution orders as seen in South Africa and the Netherlands, if applied 
against large, wealthy corporations responsible for environmental harm, has the 
potential to be a very powerful mechanism for environmental victims – including 
large groups of victims – both in terms of the amount of money available and 
the symbolic benefit of being recognised as criminally harmed. What is needed 
is greater understanding of environmental cases and their impacts at all stages 
of the criminal process, and in particular at the early investigation stage.  
DISCUSSION 
Environmental crime and environmental harm are not ‘new problems’ (see Hall, 
2013), nevertheless they are problems behind which scientific, criminological 
and legal developments are still lagging. It is perhaps for this reason above 
others that none of the systems discussed above seem particularly well adapted 
to offering redress mechanisms for environmental victims.  
Given the extremely diverse nature of environmental harm, it is clear that any 
system of redress for its victims will need to address conflicting tensions 
between offering tailored solutions that work in particular (perhaps unique) 
circumstances, whilst at the same time conveying a sense of certainty, fairness 
and consistency between cases. In this sense an administrative-based system 
utilising a standard schedule of payments seems appealing, because such 
schemes can in principle be devised to deal with a wider range of environmental 
harms beyond the officially recognised environmental crimes which fall within 
the ambit of the criminal justice system. Thus far, however, such schemes as 
have been constituted for the purpose of offering compensation or restitution to 
environmental victims have been restricted to very specific events, very specific 
countries and very specific forms of harm.  
There is also, as we have seen, a real concern that such schemes are often 
constituted for reasons of political expediency and, as such, the fear is that 
victims once again are being used to achieve political gain. Furthermore, given 
that, as we have seen, large corporations might have considerable influence 
over what does and does not succeed in this regulatory sphere (see Dal Bó, 
2006) there is always a concern that such systems will start prioritising the 
needs of industry over the needs of those individuals and communities harmed 
by polluting activities, as has arguably occurred in Japan and as is predicted by 
Stretesky et al.’s (2014) ‘treadmill of crime’. This also makes the imposition of 
blanket levies on polluting corporations to fund the schemes problematic. Of 
course, in cases where a sufficient degree of causation is established, polluters 
might be compelled to pay restitution directly to victims through an 
administrative system. In this instance, however, the need to demonstrate 
culpability removes a key advantage of the administrative route: that it does not 
require so high a standard of proof as criminal or civil actions and is therefore 
(arguably) more efficient.  
One way out of this conundrum, we have seen, is for states themselves to fund 
payments to environmental victims: just as many fund payments to (certain 
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descriptions of) victims of violent crime through existing administrative 
schemes. Conceptually we have seen that the justification for these schemes is 
(perhaps purposely) vague, however the suggestions made by some that ideal 
victims of violent crime are being unfairly singled out for special treatment 
compared to victims of other crimes, or indeed victims of social harms more 
generally, seems especially compelling in the environmental context: where the 
state itself may at least contribute to the environmental victimisation. 
Furthermore, in line with Stretesky’s et al.’s (2014) ‘treadmill of production’ 
model, offering public compensation for environmental harms (as opposed to 
wider social harms) may be justified for the reason that these harms have been 
carried out in the name of production to the ultimate benefit of the capitalist 
economy. The state need not acknowledge any fault, just as it acknowledges no 
fault when it pays victims of violent crime. It is submitted that the real barriers to 
the opening up of such a system to victims of environmental harm, or even to 
environmental crime, are economic and political: economic because of the fear 
of opening the floodgates of claims and political because environmental victims 
do not necessarily provoke the same public empathy as (blameless) victims of 
violent crime. 
Clearly then there are various reforms that could be made to the way 
administrative compensation and restitution systems operating now tend to 
function which would make them more suitable as tools for offering redress to 
environmental victims. Indeed, the reality that many environmental harms do 
not constitute actual crimes makes the retention of such systems (suitably 
developed and extended) a necessity given the limitations of both civil litigation 
and civil sanctions in this regard. Nevertheless, it is submitted that criminal 
restitution has an important role to play here too. In particular, I argue that 
criminal procedure brings numerous cathartic benefits to victims as well as 
offering the possibility of obtaining genuine economic redress. The development 
of restitution orders in other areas of criminal activity shows that this is possible, 
although at present most systems are restricted to relatively small amounts and, 
more importantly, there is a demonstrable lack of will and/or understanding 
amongst judges to provide for this kind of restitution. Whilst it might be 
countered that ‘restitution’ is not the job of the criminal court, the proliferation of 
criminal restitution schemes for other kinds of (perhaps more ‘ideal’) victims 
across most developed jurisdictions calls into question why environmental 
victims should not receive the same level of recognition. Furthermore, courts, 
whilst being less politically accountable, are also less prone to abuse and 
influence by corporate or state interests when compared with administrative 
schemes and, unlike those schemes, are at least in principle open to all victims 
of environmental crime. The criminal route also retains the power to sanction 
actual polluters in a fair and consistent manner, promoting deterrence and 
changes in social attitudes to environmental degradation in a way administrative 
schemes do not. 
Problems clearly remain in the criminal system both with the understanding and 
acceptance by sentencers of environmental concerns, as well as the ability of 
police forces and prosecutors to build successful cases. Nevertheless, the 
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above discussion has argued that these issues are not insurmountable. We 
thus arrive at a position where both administrative and criminal routes have a 
role to play in offering redress to victims of environmental harm, and the 
resulting implication is therefore that governments need to examine ways to 
better develop both these systems in a way that offers redress to those harms 
falling within and beyond the criminal law. The last proviso places the emphasis 
on green criminologists and victimologists to continue in the critical tradition of 
questioning and problematizing which harmful activities remain absent from the 
crime lexicon and the political and economic reasons behind this. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn from this discussion of 
redress mechanisms for victims of environmental harm is that at present there 
is a real division between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. Those ‘fortunate’ 
enough to be subject to a media-friendly, publicly sympathised but 
geographically and temporally contained environmental victimisation within a 
developed country have been given access to generous administrative 
compensation, and even criminal-based restitution when the victimisation is 
recognised as criminal. Those resident in poorer countries, or in poorer or 
otherwise marginalised communities where environmental degradation is 
viewed as necessary for the national interest and the imperative for production 
have found themselves lacking such official channels and most often are not in 
a financial or social position to embark upon their own civil claims.  
The reforms in both criminal and administrative redress mechanisms put 
forward above may help to ease some of these problems but alone will not 
solve them. It is submitted that such global inequality in the treatment of 
environmental victims ultimately begs the further intervention of international 
law and, in all likelihood, the careful application of human and environmental 
rights principles. This is before we even consider less anthropocentric aspects 
of the issues, and the wider range of non-human ‘victims’ which haven been 
specifically excluded from the above discussion. For human victims, another 
idea might be to pay far greater attention to the development of mediation 
schemes surrounding environmental harms (see Shmueli and Kaufman, 2006). 
As a whole the green victimology literature has begun to address such issues at 
a transnational level but the issue requires far more by way of research – not 
least of which on what victims themselves say they need – before victims of 
environmental harm can be said to be receiving adequate redress on a global 
scale. 
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